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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of strengthening humanitarian law, and, for that
matter, human rights law, is evident in light of the ubiquity of recourse
to violence to resolve international as well as internal conflicts. This
use of violence provokes the most grave deviations from even the
most minimal level of moral sensibility.' Two conflicts that have
shocked the conscience of humanity recently have been so egregious,
that as painful as those memories are for humanity, images of the
Holocaust have been resurrected.' In Rwanda, an ongoing civil war
rapidly transformed itself into a genocidal program as Hutu militia and
functionaries began a systematic slaughter of the Tutsi.3 In the
former Yugoslavia, Serbian military and paramilitary forces continue
to implement a policy of ethnic cleansing in which genocide, mass
murder, torture, systematic rape and many other atrocities have been
directed at non-Serb nationalities.4 These situations led the United
Nations Security Council to create ad hoc tribunals to adjudicate
crimes against humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law and Center For Governmental
Responsibility, Gainesville, Florida; Affiliate Professor of Anthropology, University of Florida,
Gainesville, Florida; Director, Project For Advanced Studies and Research In Peace And Human
Rights; Former Chair of Board, Amnesty International (USA); Former President, Policy Sciences
Center. This essay is dedicated to John Sutherland, retired editor, The Evening Post, Port
Elizabeth, South Africa, on his 80th Birthday.
1. See 1 HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 50-140 (1992)
(summarizing war crimes committed in the Balkans War); 2 HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA, 30-391 (1993) [hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH REPORT].
2. ROY GUTMAN, WITNESS To GENOCIDE vii-xvi, 36-40 (1993).
3. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1995, at
249-52 (1995); AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE, 206-376 (1994).
4. See generally GuTMAN, supra note 2.
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Rwanda.5
These events have also invigorated momentum for a permanent
international criminal tribunal.6  The statistic given by Professor
Rummel that approximately 170,000,000 persons were murdered by
their sovereign governments in our age is both sobering and shock-
ing.7 This kind of statistic so elevates the scale of the humanitarian
and human rights problems that even a permanent international court
or tribunal may not be more than a symbolic band-aid. Indeed, this
kind of statistical nightmare may mandate a more fundamental
rethinking about the basis of human, political, and associational
organization as we approach the twenty-first century. We must
rethink, so to speak, the conceptual and normative basis of the body
politic itself.'
At the 1995 Conference on Strengthening the Enforcement of
5. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
(establishing a tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 955 (1994) (establishing a tribunal for Rwanda).
6. On May 17, 1993, the International Law Commission reconvened a working group to
develop a proposal for a permanent court of international justice. Report of the Working Group
on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. International Law Commission, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255-335, U.N. Doc. AJ48110 (1993) [hereinafter Draft Statute].
7. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 9 (1994).
8. The great and unrelieved tension built into the United Nations Charter reposes in the
effort to accommodate the dangers of the abuse of international power by aggression with the
notion of "sovereignty" and the inviolability of the internal domestic affairs of a sovereign state.
This precept is in tension with the rights of peoples and individuals encased in the boundaries
of sovereign nation-states. The tension is heightened when the facts of human interaction cut
across state and group lines creating the socio-economic reality of political and juridical
interdependence and interdetermination. The metaphor spaceship earth is sometimes invoked
to stress this element of existential realism. The European Union process is a remarkable
example of how these forces may be peacefully managed. This in turn affects what we mean by
the terms "sovereign" and "state." See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 139-63 (1990); Vincent Cable, The
Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at
23 (discussing the impact of economic integration on national power); Stephan J. Del Rosso, Jr.,
The Insecure State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 175 (discussing challenges posed to the state by
economic integration, trade alliances, and changing international regimes); Gerald B. Helman
& Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1992-1993, at 3 (proposing
U.N. conservatorships of failed states); Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other
Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 115 (discussing
how the concept of a nation-state has changed particularly with the creation of the European
Union); Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of The Region State, FOREIGN A-F., Spring 1993, at 78
(arguing that the "nation state" has been replaced by a "region-state" which is defined by the
economic forces of the global market); Susan Strange, The Defective State, DAEDALUS, Spring
1995, at 55 (discussing the impact of economic integration on the social science conception of the
state); cf. J. Brian Atwood, Suddenly, Chaos, WASH. POST, July 31,1994, at C9 (arguing that the
future of nation-states has become the new challenge to American foreign policy).
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Humanitarian Rights, Professor Donald Horowitz, a world authority
on ethnic conflict, raised the question about the possibility of avoiding
genocide in the context of an ethnic conflict by a more strident
defense of the sovereignty idea.' He would apparently approve of a
world community that is less tolerant of secessionist movements.
Essentially, he is skeptical of ethnically conditioned claims to self-
determination, or disquieted that the price they exact in devaluing
humanitarian values is out of proportion to the claim itself. He is
particularly critical of the role of the Badinter Arbitration Commis-
sion,'" which provided a modicum of legal validation to the processes
of transformation or reconfiguration of the Yugoslav federal/state
system."
The bogus claims to self-determination cleverly invoked by
Belgrade and its surrogates subsequently in the Krajina (a majority
Serb region in Croatia) and in Serb occupied Bosnia (Republika
Srbska) are a stern warning about the ramifications of permitting
abuse of claims to self determination. The claim to self-determination
9. Professor Horowitz is a distinguished authority on the impact of ethnicity on political
behavior. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOuTH AFRICA? CONSTITU-
TIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991) (discussing the relationship between ethnic
tension and the development of democratic institutions).
10. The Badinter Arbitration Commission was assembled by the European Community to
decide legal issues related to the Yugoslavian conflict to which its members could not agree. The
decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission can be found in 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992).
11. Despite the sophistication and realism of the proposition implicit in Horowitz's view, that
the core residuum of ethnic identification inhibits and often destroys efforts at creating political
cultures that generate loyalty, solidarity and levels of social integration with symbols of identity
other than that of ethnicity, I remain skeptical about the adequacy of ethnic identities, to the
exclusion of other important symbols of identity, that might crucially impact upon a community's
process of developing effective power. I suspect that the Horowitz thesis is particularly
vulnerable in contexts where the evidence is overwhelming that ethnic atrocity and murder are
issues of decision-makers manipulating both insecurity and the instruments of propaganda to
promote the proposition that ethnic violence is both irrational and inexplicable. Winston P.
Nagan, Towards Unpacking the War in Former Yugoslavia: An International Lawyer's Perspective,
HUM. PEACE (IOAES Commission on the Study of Peace, University of Florida, Gainesville,
Fla.), Winter 1994, at 3.
In the context of ethnicity, self-determination and the defense of territorial sovereignty, I
am not as skeptical of the task the Badinter Arbitration Commission set for itself. Indeed, I
believe that its juridical determination that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in a state of
dissolution fully accords with reality. Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1497 (Conf. for Peace in
Yugo. Arb. Com. 1992). The effort to prescribe acceptable standards of conduct for the
management of political reconfiguration is also important. The rejection of these standards by
the Krajina Serbs (Krajina has been reintegrated into the republic of Croatia as a result of the
military action in July of this year) who now control the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs does not
make these standards one bit less relevant to a durable solution to the crisis of transition. See
Opinion No. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1525 (Conf. for Peace in Yugo. Arb. Com. 1992).
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should in no way be abused by invoking it as a justification, however
transparent, for the continuing tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This claim serves as a continuing threat to the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Republic of Croatia itself.
I have a great deal of sympathy for Horowitz's defense of
national sovereignty and for his skepticism of certain claims to
secession and self-determination. I also have a great deal of admira-
tion for the effort to provide legal standards for the orderly manage-
ment of change in nation-state systems when change is mandated by
political reality.'2 How and by what criteria we promote, prescribe,
apply, appraise, terminate and create new political associations is a
difficult and contentious exercise of which the accounting under
humanitarian law is simply one dimension of the failure of politics,
diplomacy and law. Because these larger issues may take us far afield
from the narrower focus of strengthening humanitarian law, it may
nonetheless be said that humanitarian law as well as human rights law
can provide a viable framework of normative standards to manage
transitions in ways that are more congruent with United Nations
Charter expectations and basic standards of decency. Strengthening
humanitarian values, by deepening our understanding of humanitarian
law and how it is to be given operative vitality, will surely aid us in
understanding how the international community can intervene in
managing transitions in a more realistic and cost-effective manner."3
II. KEY THEMES RELATING TO STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
I suspect that there are in effect five interrelated, dominating
themes relating to strengthening international humanitarian law. First,
we must address the issues of international crimes as a prescriptive or
lawmaking dimension of the international legal process.14 Second, we
face the general question of the ability of an international criminal
tribunal to provide an applicative and enforcement dimension, or,
more specifically, a dimension of international efficacy, to the
prescriptive codes and precepts that seek to control and regulate
behaviors deemed to be matters of international criminal concern.
12. Opinion No. 9, supra note 11.
13. By cost-effective, I refer not only to the expenditure of international capital (for peace
keeping, materials, humanitarian aid, and so on), but also to the cost of human suffering itself.
14. See, eg., A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Vey
P. Nanda eds., 1986).
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Third, there is the specific form and function of the ad hoc Tribunals
for dealing with certain kinds of internationally prohibited,
criminalized acts or omissions in the context of both the former
Yugoslavia-now a state system comprised of several independent
sovereign Republics-and Rwanda. 5 Fourth, there are the technical
problems of giving effect to both the prescription and application of
international criminal law, a challenge that tests many assumptions
about the objective reality of criminal law competence, independent
of individual sovereign states. Fifth, even more critically, there is the
uncomfortable issue of the survival of a viable international rule of
law should this experiment with the ad hoc Tribunals in the prescrip-
tion and application of international criminal law fail.
The best way to approach these themes is to place them in an
appropriate politico-juridical context. Accordingly, in the language
now fashionable in literature of the psychological and social sciences,
we should "contextualize" the problem of the prescription and
application of the international criminal justice process.
III. THE RELEVANT CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
What I have called the international criminal justice process is in
reality an outcome of what Professor McDougal has called the global
community process, or more specifically, it is an outcome of the global
power and constitutive process. 6 The organization or the group in
international relations most specialized to power, and to the use and
often abuse of power (with actions such as coercion, violence, and
15. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 5 (establishing
international criminal tribunal for Rwanda); International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT132 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 493 (1994) [hereinafter Tribunal Rules].
16. See M.S. McDougal et al., The World Process of Effective Power: The Global War
System in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 353 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael
Reisman eds. 1985); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Community: A Planetary Social
Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988); W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global
War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973). See generally Winston P. Nagan,
Civil Process and Power: Thoughts From A Policy-Oriented Perspectiv4 39 FLA. L. REV. 453
(1987). For a discussion of the relation between the constitutive process and the issue of
"sovereignty" see infra Part VI.
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war) is undoubtedly the nation-state.17 According to McDougal and
Lasswell, "[t]he nation-state, a territorially based entity organized for
power purposes, is still the most conspicuous institution through which
individuals seek to make and influence decisions in the global
arena."'" These authors then note, "[t]here are, of course a vast
number of other important, power-conditioned actors on the world
stage including intergovernmental organizations, national liberation
movements, political and civic associations, business organizations."' 9
However, "the individual human being remains the creator of, and
ultimate actor in, all the organized participants."'' 2
There are, it seems to me, three salient dimensions to internation-
al criminal law. First, states prescribe criminal law standards and seek
to give these standards extraterritorial reach if certain jurisdictional
facts make it reasonable for a domestic forum or agency to extend the
reach of its law.2' Second, there are the international criminal law
prescriptions unaided by treaty making processes that a state may seek
to prescribe and apply in particular instances. Finally, there are the
treaty based expectations that carry the obligation to prosecute or
extradite an offender.
Whether expectations are generated by practice, custom or
codification, even "universal" crimes will often be dependent on state
action for their specific prescription and enforcement. If there is to be
a viable international criminal law regime, its coherence and efficacy
rest to a large degree on the reality of sovereign state power. If the
sovereign or its agents are mass murderers, the blunt juxtaposition of
criminal responsibility and sovereign power would have to be
reconciled to some degree, or sovereignty trumps international
criminal law.
The central problem for international criminal justice becomes
more apparent when we emphasize the point that criminal law is to an
extraordinary degree a state monopoly, and states are still the most
concrete expression of organized community power in the internation-
17. See generally Winston P. Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict: A Systematic Appraisal of
Traditional and Contemporary Theories, 3 N.Y. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 370-75, 378-79 (1982).
18. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 148 (1992).
19. ld.
20. Id.
21. A perusal of a number of leading criminal law casebooks will quickly disclose that there
are scant references to international criminal law. The implied assumption for this omission may
be that criminal law professors believe the subject is a municipal law phenomenon falling under
the sovereignty of the state.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
al system.' If there is to be a viable international criminal law
system, this constraint must be accommodated. Indeed, securing an
organized collective international criminal law prospect would seem to
require intergovernmental organizations (the United Nations, or
within that organization, the Security Council) to co-opt or preempt
a significant portion of the power presently allocated to the states
themselves.'
Finally, enforcement of international criminal law is especially
complex because the tradition of international law, despite important
deviations, still limits the role of the individual as a subject (either as
defendant or plaintiff) of international law itsel, notwithstanding the
social reality that at the back of all instances of organizational
behavior are the finite, concrete human agents of decision.24 Indeed,
making individuals directly accountable under international law has
been a painful and sporadic exercise in the experience of international
criminal law.
The central duality of the international criminal justice system is
that the prescription of its most fundamental precepts has been a
matter of international agreement and strong rhetorical consensus. Its
application is almost the antithesis of this consensus. As one
commentator has indicated:
[M]odern international criminal law can be said to have commenced
in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna with efforts to abolish slavery.
Since then 317 international instruments on substantive criminal law
have been agreed to covering international crimes such as aggres-
sion, war crimes, crimes against humanity, apartheid, torture, piracy
22. According to Professor Bert V. A. Roling:
International law is a body of law characteristic of an under-developed community,
lacking a central legislative body and a central power which is able to enforce the law.
This lack of enforcement power is one of the characteristics of the law of nations,
showing clearly its underveloped [sic] character. Another feature of its undervelopment
[sic] is the absence of a central court which can decide upon conflicts concerning the
interpretation of the law. Because such a court with compulsory powers does not exist,
international law is compelled to recognize the right of each party to interpret the law
as it chooses. States and other subjects of international law are bound by international
law, but their right of autointerpretation of that law is also recognized.
Bert V. A. Roling, Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, in
THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAWV OF ARMED CoNFLIcr, 199, 199 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
I am skeptical that decentralized law, be it national or international, is necessarily underdevel-
oped. Perhaps the underdevelopment lies in our jurisprudential assumptions used to describe
and inquire into diverse systems of public order.
23. The classic early study of this anti-formalist theme is HAROLD L. LASSWELL, WORLD
POLITICS AND PERSONAL SECURrrY (1965).
24. See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 18, at 148.
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on board commercial vessels, aircraft hijacking, kidnapping of
diplomats and other internationally protected persons, taking of
civilian hostages and environmental damages to name a few.'
Affective international criminal procedure is a rare legal commodity
outside the reality of sovereign state power. The process of prescrib-
ing these codes has occurred in most part, though not exclusively,
through international agreement. This reality implies at least the
existence of some internationally sanctioned, validating authority.
On the other hand, these codes are largely given effect unevenly
in a decentralized state system. 6  There is of course a continuing
effort in both official and unofficial circles to create an international
criminal tribunal.' These efforts have been limited by the political-
juridical reality just described. Hence, the dominant method of
enforcing international criminal law is through the jurisdictional
competence allocated to the territorially organized bodies politic that
we refer to as sovereign nation-states.28
The model of the sovereign state operates under severe pressures
for change as the global community seeks to accommodate the social
realities of interdependence and interdetermination. 29 Notwithstand-
ing this weakening of the Westphalian edifice of international
organization centered on the sovereign state, the state dominated
system is still a powerful factor in international relations and
international law.
It is perhaps in the area of international criminal law where states
have been most resistant to relinquish their jurisdictional competence.
Increasing levels of coercion at intra- and international levels, as well
as gross forms of human rights and humanitarian abuse, have
generated escalating beliefs that certain forms of international criminal
behavior are matters beyond the sovereignty precept of Article 2.7 of
the U.N. Charter."0 It is apparent that these violations are indeed
25. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 19, n. 67 (1991).
26. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S.
LEGISLATION 3-4, 99-134 (1985).
27. See, eg., Draft Statute, supra note 6, at 255-58; COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF
MANKIND (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993).
28. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 431-44, 901-07 (1995).
29. See RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-57 (1989).
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
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matters of inclusive international jurisdictional concern, not only in
prescription, but also in application and enforcement. The time may
have come to look more carefully at the idea of state sovereignty and
the conceptual basis of international criminal law.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW
The term "sovereignty" has both political and juridical implica-
tions in international law and international relations 1  These
implications are important for understanding the scope and efficacy of
international criminal law. Criminal law in general involves the
prohibition of conduct that is more than simply delictual. Crimes are
one of the techniques that organized bodies politic use to respond to
patterns of conduct deemed incompatible with community life. These
techniques could be as innocuous as rules of etiquette or social and
political conventions, or they could range to conduct labelled criminal
by the community or body politic.
In general, criminal behavior should be reserved for conduct that
involves a serious challenge to social life. The characterization
"crime" implies a public power to deal with the behavior.32 Since
World War II, there has been an increasing tendency to characterize
certain types of international behavior, especially egregious behaviors
having international impacts, as criminal. The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal included international crimes against
the peace, defined as "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of
a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties," as
well as crimes against humanity such as "[m]urder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
the civilian population before or during the war or persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds .... ,
Leading criminal law scholars indicate "[t]he whole field of
substantive criminal law constitutes a rather stern moral code. It is
not exhaustive in this respect but represents the points at which
conduct is deemed so offensive to the moral judgment of the
31. See W.M. Reisman, Responses To Crimes of Discrimination and GenocideAn Appraisal
of The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29
(1971).
32. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD M. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 243
(5th ed. 1977).
33. CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, art. 6, reprinted in 13 DEP'T
ST. BULL 223,224 (1945).
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community as to call for punishment."34  The community these
scholars have in mind is usually the body politic of the sovereign
nation state.
Indeed, several defendants convicted in Nuremberg received the
death sentence.' Criminal law in general often carries the prospect
of severe sanctions, which are of course penal in character. Hence,
sanctions that are meant to accompany the law of crimes, whether
national or international, are meant to punish, and their application is
coercive. Punishment is in the name of the collective national or
international community. In practice, penal law is very decentralized
and thus is mainly an explicit invocation of sovereign authority.
Graham Hughes has indicated that the several conceptual bases
behind the idea of a crime overlap to a certain extent. Hughes
expresses that position as follows:
[T]wo concepts of crime overlap, and it is important to elucidate the
relations between them. First, there is an idea of crime that might
be called natural and that is intuitively understood by most people.
It embodies a sense of an act that is deeply wrong, that evokes
strong communal disapproval, and that is thought to deserve, indeed
to call for a punitive sanction .... [T]his idea of crime is connected
with a particular set of procedures and with special officials, special
courts, and perhaps special rules of evidence and special avenues of
appeal. This body of law is usually called criminal, or penal, law...
and it always has as a possible outcome the imposition on the
defendant of some disadvantage-such as imprisonment, a fine, or
probation-for engaging in prohibited conduct.36
This latter base is of course related to the efficacy of enforcement and
assumes that crime is the business of the sovereign nation-state. The
most practical questions about international criminal law and state
sovereignty revolve around the fact that international criminal law is
still significantly a matter of "sovereign" competence.
In this way, under the doctrine of the Lotus decision, 7 the idea
that restrictions on the sovereignty of states ought not to be presumed
has continuing vitality, especially in the criminal law context.38 In the
34. See PERKINS AND BoYcE, supra note 32, at 243.
35. The Arch War Criminals, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 20, 1995, at 41.
36. Graham Hughes, Concept of Crime, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JuSTICE 294,294-
95 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
37. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10.
38. See generally Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potential for United
States Adoption and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, The Covenants on Civil and
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
context of international war crimes, the principle derived from the
Lotus case is well stated by Koessler as follows:
[n]othing in the present international law limits the discretion of a
belligerent State in its decision as to whether the war crimes trials
of captured enemy nationals should take place before its ordinary
civil or military courts or before tribunals established ad hoc ... ?9
From an operational perspective, the practical question generally has
been how far a state may go in establishing the external reach of its
criminal jurisdiction under international law. The phrase "under
international law" suggests some accommodating prudential limit of
the reach of a state's competence from the perspective of other states
whose interest may be compromised when a state allocates for itself
the right to try the nationals of other states under its own criminal
justice standards.
If the sovereignty idea has to be unpacked for our time, the
unpacker will have to confront several basic difficulties-some of a
conceptual and some of an empirical nature. For example, from a
conceptual point of view, the term has at once had the contradictory
characteristics of being both reified and porous.' At times the
sovereignty doctrine can be an impenetrably rigid juridical artifact as
states incant the ritual of brooking no interference with their internal
affairs. If Rummel is only partially correct about the number of
murders by government in this century,4' we should have concerns,
even if we are completely insensitive to politics, about the estimated
figure of some 170,000,000 murders by sovereigns. Indeed, we ought
to be skeptical about just how much the veil of sovereignty obscures.
States that have made the most exaggerated claims to a reified form
of sovereignty seem to be at the top of the list of the worst offenders
when it comes to state sanctioned killing.
Even the respected U.S. Senate acted as an unwitting accomplice
to the insulation of governmental mass murder from an appropriate
Political Rights and Economi4 Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311 (1990)
(discussing political obstacles to ratification of international human rights treaties in the United
states).
39. Maximillian Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEO. L. J. 18, 52(1950).
40. Operational constitutions often exhibit the characteristics of being reified and porous
at the same time.
41. RUMMEL, supra note 7, at 9.
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measure of international concern and timely condemnation.42 It is
tragic to recall the fate of the Genocide Convention before the United
States Senate. After 37 years, a mildly embarrassing version of the
Convention made it through the Senate's "advice and consent"
process, generating concerns about the numerous reservations,
declarations and understandings that accompanied it.43 It was the
notorious or heroic (depending on one's politics) Senator John Bricker
who said that he would seek to keep human rights covenants buried
so deep that no one would dare to secure their resurrection.44 As
those who were actively engaged in lobby strategies following the
Senate vote on the Genocide Convention have noted, the attitude
articulated by Senator Bricker also hindered the ratification of other
main human rights covenants, such as torture, civil and political rights,
and racial discrimination.45
As pointed out by Senator Jesse Helms, the core sticking point of
contemporary ratification that ultimately has to be overcome is the
sovereignty issue.46 For Helms and his colleagues, it is a frightening
thought that if torture were made an international crime or delict, the
United States itself would be subject to the sovereignty of a foreign
entity, thereby compromising the sovereignty of the United States.
V. SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE: REIFICATION AND
POROUSNESS
In the United States the ambiguity surrounding the sovereignty
doctrine permeates many areas of international legal concern in
42. Francis A. Boyle, The Hypocrisy and Racism Behind The Formulation of U.S. Human
Rights Foreign Policy: In Honor of Clyde Ferguson, 16 Soc. JusT. 71 (1989) (criticizing United
States' human rights policy).
43. See Genocide Convention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Genocide Convention of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 193-99 (1970) (statement of Senator Sam J.
Ervin).
44. Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition To Human Rights Treaties
in The United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. R'rs. Q. 309, 309
(1988).
45. Id. (discussing how most human rights treaties and other human rights legislation have
not received Senate approval).
46. For example, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, discussing the relationship between the
role of the United Nations and United States policy, stated that notions of threats to American
independence of action are important issues to Americans: "In some groups of Americans, there
is a distinct fear of loss of U.S. sovereignty to the U.N." Barbara Crossette, U.N. Finds
Skepticism Is Eroding the Hope That Is Its Foundation, N.Y. TiMES, June 25, 1995, § 1, at 1
(quoting Indiana Representative Lee H. Hamilton); see also Nagan, supra note 38, at 317-18, n.
13.
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addition to the human fights and international criminal law context.
The evolution of our doctrines of sovereign immunity' and act of
state' are good indicators of both the porous character of the
sovereignty doctrine and its capacity for reification.
Two recent cases illustrate this point. Recently the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the jurisdiction of a U.S. court over a Mexican physician
abducted from Mexico by federal law enforcement agents. 49 The
physician had been implicated in the torture murder of Enrique
Camerena, a federal law enforcement agent. The existence of an
extradition treaty could not insulate porous Mexican sovereignty from
the long arm of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia provided a blunt illustration of how far a court is prepared
to go to affirm the reified version of the sovereignty precept in a claim
against the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany). In Princz v.
Federal Republic of Gennany," the D.C. Court of Appeals held that
Princz, the plaintiff, could not sue Germany for legal claims growing
out of his experience in the notorious concentration death camp and
slave labor process of the Holocaust. Among the grounds for refusing
47. The United States has long subscribed to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
namely, that immunity attends acts jure imperil and does not attend acts jure gestionis. The prac-
tice is uneven, even "political", concerning when sovereign immunity would be successfully
invoked and when it would fail to immunize a sovereign. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1976), seeks to give some objective juridical criteria for making
such choices. See generally Verinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 461 U.S. 480 (1983);
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct.
1471 (1993); see also Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 489 (1992).
48. The literature is enormous on the evolution or devolution of the act of state Doctrine.
The modem high point of the doctrine is reflected in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). Apart from legislative efforts to undo Sabbatino, the Court found an ingenious
way to change the result of the case through juridical action in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). In this case Justice Rehnquist simply collapsed the
conceptual basis of the act of state doctrine into that of the sovereign immunity doctrine on the
basis that both doctrines have their "common basis" in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116, 146 (1812). Of course, in 1972 the sovereign immunity doctrine came with a
restrictive gloss for commercial exceptions. Subsequent cases have made the act of state doctrine
exceedingly porous. See e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International, 493 U.S.
400 (1990).
49. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
50. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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to breach the veil of sovereignty was the surprising idea that Princz's
injury, or his forced role as a slave laborer to sustain the German war
effort, had no "direct effect" on the United States." In blunt but
accurate terms, the court held that an effort to dispose of a U.S.
citizen by genocide had no direct effect on the United States sufficient
to implead a foreign sovereign.52
Apart from the court's suspect analysis of the direct effects test
and its ignorance of any plausible theory of international jurisdiction,
at issue in this case are precepts of universal jurisdiction. These
precepts are those of jus cogens, international juridical precepts which
are meant to limit the sovereign imperative in international law. Put
into the context of the United States' role in the Nuremberg process,
the D.C. Court of Appeals simply construed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in a way that is a legal embarrassment, surpassed only
by the German reluctance to settle with Princz out of court.
These illustrations of both reification and porousness inherent in
the operation of the sovereignty doctrine are an indication of the
difficulties that attend and have constrained efforts to create, inter alia,
a permanent international criminal court. It remains to be seen
whether the action taken by the Sixth Committee in its consideration
of the Draft Statute53 will be another multigenerational exercise in
international idealism and operational constipation. That is to say,
everyone agrees on the theory of a permanent international criminal
court so long as it does not come at the expense of their sovereignty.
The present level of political and diplomatic motion is doubtless owed
to the magnitude of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda.54
While sovereign states have often reified their sovereign status in
international law as it relates to the regime of international criminal
51. This appears to radically undermine a traditional principle of international jurisdiction,
namely the venerable protective principle.
52. It should be noted that Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit filed a trenchant dissent:
"Congress did not intend to thwart the opportunity of an American victim of the Holocaust to
have his claims heard by the United States judicial system. Because I cannot agree that the
FSIA requires us to slam the door in the face of Hugo Princz, I dissent." Princz, 26 F.3d at 1185.
53. Draft Statute; supra note 6.
54. On the issue of humanitarian and gross violations of human rights in Bosnia-
Herzegovina see Amnesty International Report, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Living For The Day -
Forcible Expulsions from Bijelina and Janja (AT Index: Eur 63/22194); AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL U.S.A., supra note 3, at 75-78, 108-09, 315-19; see also HELSINKI WATCH REPORT,
supra note 1; UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR
CRIMES AND GENOCIDE-A REPORT ON A UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONFERENCE
(1994).
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law, they have been porous about the prescription, if not the
application, of crimes of universal or near universal import. There has
been no obvious reluctance to prescribe international crimes of
universal reach." In this sense, the allocation of a lawmaking
competence over criminal law concerns of inclusive importance is
effectually a divestiture of a sovereign lawmaking competence from
the state to the general international community.
However, criminal law prescriptions, as indicated, have an
attribute of sovereignty in the old-fashioned Austinian sense. They
are more overtly imperative than other species of law. By imperative
we mean prescriptions are accompanied by a higher expectation of
coercion, including public violence. The sovereign state has been
described by international relations realists as the repository of
legitimate violence. The coercive dimension of an effective criminal
justice process lends weight to this insight.
Because organized coercion is a characteristic that accompanies
the criminal law, it may indeed be more easily identified with the
exercise of the prerogative on national sovereignty. It is all the more
remarkable that the pressures of international life, and the perception
of self-interest, have conspired to generate a porous conception of the
doctrine of sovereignty in many areas of criminal law and procedure.
The imperative facts of interdependence and interdetermination have
revealed a credible corpus of substantive international criminal law,
and even more an impressive code of human rights precepts vested
with a criminal law character. On the other hand, the experience with
genocide, human rights and sovereignty tells us a good deal about the
limitations the concept of sovereignty imposes on giving efficacy to
precepts of both humanitarian and human rights law.1
6
55. For relevant background, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of The Draft Code of
Crimes Against The Peace and Security of Mankind, in Commentaries, supra note 27, at 1-21;
Draft Code of Crimes Against The Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. International Law
Commission, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
56. See LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE (1981). "There was the horror that considerations of
sovereignty and of military strategy should take precedence over humanitarian concern for the
almost countless innocent victims of this deadly struggle. And there was incredulity that as many
as 1,000,000 people might have to die so as to safeguard the unity of an artificially created
colonial conglomerate of peoples." Id. at 75. Kuper refers to the Biafran/Nigerian genocide.
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VI. DECONSTRUCTING AND REINVENTING
SOVEREIGNTY AS A SYMBOL OF A COMPREHENSIVE
CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS
Distinguished international law publicists recognize what they
regard as the "inescapability of the concept of sovereignty as a quality
of the State under present-day international law." 7  They also
recognize it as a "fundamental principle of the law of nations." 8
However, even the strongest proponents of the positivist view of
international law conditioned by sovereign states assert that interna-
tional law strongly rejects the admissibility of absolute sovereignty as
the basic principle of international law. 9 Surveys of the writings of
diverse authors such as Korowicz, Larsen and Jenks'" indicate a clear
repudiation of any absolutist notion of sovereignty implicit in the
command theory of law and its progeny. It will doubtless be recalled
that Austin's theory of law relegated international law to the domain
of positive morality, a dubious status it shared with constitutional
law.6'
Theory and practice concede a certain flexibility about what
aspects of international and constitutional law are to be designated
sovereign. However, the criteria by which such practical designations
are made often reflect levels of reification and porousness about what
is and is not sovereign, and what effect and deference are in practice
to be accorded such characterizations. As earlier indicated, the law of
sovereign immunity is a good example of this proposition. The
reification of state behaviors labelled jure imperii gave ground in
practice to state behaviors that could be juridically classified as jure
gestionis, or the competence of a domestic court or tribunal to treat a
foreign sovereign state just like any other litigant. The act of state
doctrine in U.S. practice has been similarly eroded, including the
implicit sovereignty assumptions that served to insulate acts of
sovereign states done within their own territories from adjudication in
57. MAREK STANISLAW KOROWIcZ, SOME PRESENT ASPECrS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17 (1961); cf. ARTHUR LARSON ET AL, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE
LAW (1965).
58. KOROWICZ, supra note 57, at 16-17.
59. Id. at 17.
60. LARSON ET AL, supra note 57.
61. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES
OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 12, 140 (1964); contra J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES
226-30 (1980).
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the courts of other sovereign states.
The roots of reification and porousness in modem international
law practice and custom, I would suggest, are tied to the processes of
decolonization and the expansion of the state sovereign system. The
post World War II processes of decolonization penetrated, and later
eroded, the claims of colonial powers that their colonies fell within
their sovereignty and were thus beyond the reach of international law
concern.
The key doctrine that eroded the colonial sovereignty idea was
the claim of indigenous political movements to self-determination,
which in post cold war practice became a jus cogens principle of
international law. In this context, the claim to self-determination
simultaneously denied colonial sovereignty and affirmed sovereignty
sustained by self-determination. Latent in claims to self-determination
was the idea of sovereign independence.
The outcome of the decolonization self-determination process was
a radical increase in internationally recognized claims to national state
sovereignty. However, vast numbers of these newly independent
sovereign states were weak in terms of national integration and
foreign relations. Moreover, many new states were both products and
victims of cold war politics. This led to widespread reification of
sovereignty in vast numbers of newly independent states, justified
under the internal affairs domestic jurisdiction clause of the U.N.
Charter.62 At the same time that states were claiming widespread
immunity from international duties and obligations (especially in the
human rights sphere), these same states were claiming expanded
sovereign rights as a form of compensation for the wrongs of colonial-
imperialist exploitation and hegemony.
As is now apparent from this discussion, the term sovereignty is
one of the most used and abused terms in the language of law, social
science, history and international relations. The term means different
things in different historic periods. It also means different things to
different scientific and intellectual disciplines. It means different
things to practical politicians, international civil servants, diplomats,
and both domestic and transnational jurists; it may mean radically
different things to practical politicians in a diverse, pluralistic, cross-
cultural world.
For example, a Western European politician may accept the
mutations of state sovereignty as a necessary incident of European
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
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political and economic integration. A Chinese politician may see in
some Pacific Rim practices an infringement on the internal affairs of
a sovereign state, rejecting natural or incidental mutations of
sovereignty by the alleged facts of interdependence and
interdetermination, either economic or political. I shall try to show
that there are multiple political-juridical meanings embedded in the
sovereignty idea that in both historical and cross-cultural terms may
give a stable, designative, empirical reference to the term "sovereign-
ty".
Let us begin our deconstruction with a simple ordinary language
sensitive phrase: "The Queen is Sovereign". A child familiar with folk
tales will doubtless associate the term "Queen" or "King" with the
term "sovereign" and then equate the term "sovereign" with the terms
"ruler" or "rule-maker". What, over time, is the difference in usage
between "Queen Elizabeth I" and "Queen Elizabeth II"? To answer
this question meaningfully we would have to look at what might be
usefully described as the constitutional position of the monarch. In
other words, we need still other words to unpack the sovereign status
of Elizabeths I and II.
As a factual matter, it may be accurate to describe the regime of
Elizabeth I as a system of relatively personalized competence in which
the institution of the monarchy and the relevant persona are largely
undifferentiated. The ordinary user of language will also doubtless
appreciate that the constitutional position of Elizabeth II is substan-
tially different. The meaning of sovereignty in the 16th century is
obviously different from its meaning in the 20th century.
Sovereignty often means different things to different people, even
to different cultural paradigms. Yet in international law, the law of a
multicultural, diverse, pluralistic world order, the term has incredible
currency as an organizing symbol of international legal and political
order while simultaneously inviting controversy.
The diverse and often partial meanings attributed to the term
sovereignty mean that its invocation is unclear and fraught with
ambiguity. Indeed, from the practice of decision-makers and the
writings of eminent scholars, there are certain identifiable core
references which the term sovereignty evokes. For example, the term
includes a reference to the notion of a body politic (a complex idea of
which the nation-state is simply one example); it includes a reference
to control or efficacy in political and legal processes; and it includes
an ambiguous reference to the idea of governance with either an
implicit legitimacy or an authority component. These core designa-
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tions have been implicit in the many partial and incomplete references
the term has come to symbolize, such as:
(1) Sovereignty as a personalized monarch (real or ritualized);
(2) Sovereignty as a symbol for absolute, unlimited control or
power;
(3) Sovereignty as a symbol of political legitimacy;
(4) Sovereignty as a symbol of political authority;(5) Sovereignty as a symbol of self-determined, national indepen-
dence;
(6) Sovereignty as a symbol of governance and constitutional
order;
(7) Sovereignty as a criterion of jurisprudential validation of all
law (grundnorm, rule of recognition, sovereign);
(8) Sovereignty as a symbol of the juridical personality of Sover-
eign Equality;
(9) Sovereignty as a symbol of "recognition";
(10) Sovereignty as a formal unit of a legal system;
(11) Sovereignty as a symbol of powers, immunities, or privileges;
(12) Sovereignty as a symbol of jurisdictional competence to make
and/or apply law; and
(13) Sovereignty as a symbol of basic governance competencies
(constitutive process).
The discourse of international criminal law would be greatly improved
if the reification and porousness of the term sovereignty, in this
context, is put into a more disciplined theoretical focus that stresses
the issue of constitutive competencies and interests, permitting analysis
to clarify which interests are sovereignty exclusive and which are
sovereignty inclusive. Such a focus would do a great deal to clarify
the reach, purpose and competence to apply, prescribe and enforce
what is called "international criminal law".
One of the major vices of the term "sovereignty" is the designa-
tive reference given to the analytically distinct concepts of authority
and control. The sovereignty idea in reified garb continues to
perpetuate the Austinian fallacy of collapsing authority and control,
making it extremely difficult to properly appreciate how international
criminal law is rationally prescribed and applied. Indeed, a proper
appreciation of these processes is crucial to developing a more rational
approach to the international, constitutional allocation of competence
in controlling and regulating criminal behaviors that require effective
community interventions. The destructive impact of criminal
behaviors on important world order values are serious enough that
effective policing is required from local to global levels in the name of
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the world community as a whole.
Stated simply, a complete denial of the principles of humanitarian
law, especially when grave breaches of that law are involved, also
represents a rejection of fundamental human rights precepts and may
point to an alternative normative order that essentially disparages the
precept of human dignity. To strengthen the conceptual and doctrinal
basis of humanitarian law we must purge the sovereignty precept of
the conceptual and normative confusion it generates. We need more
precision about the nature of the specific problems in which sovereign-
ty is invoked as a sword or a shield, a clearer perception of the
common and special interest it sometimes seeks to promote, protect
or compromise, and a clearer delineation of its precise role in the
constitutional order and promise of the U.N. Charter. We must map
and locate sovereignty more precisely within the context of global
power and constitutive processes.
As applied to the constitutional position of the ad hoc Tribunals,
the practical question is whether the common interest of sovereign
entities is better protected by this constitutional innovation, or
whether exclusive parochial interests of a reified sovereignty precept
undermine this effort at grounding international justice in its practical
application. Additionally, some states may view the ad hoc nature of
the Tribunals as just that-ad hoc and an exception to the overriding
imperium of state sovereign competence over international criminal
law. Other state parties may, however, see the constitutional
innovation of an ad hoc tribunal as the first tentative step in creating
an independent, international criminal justice process of long duration.
VII. SOVEREIGNTY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The term "sovereignty" in the U.N. Charter is most visible in the
context of sovereign equality. Outside this context, the term is rarely
used in the text of the Charter. Indeed, Charter Article 2.7 uses the
term "domestic jurisdiction" as a precept that seems intentionally less
inclusive than the term "sovereign" suggests. 3 The U.N. Charter is
part of a world constitutional instrument. As a constitution, the
Charter is the formal basis of an international rule of law. One of its
primary purposes is to constrain sovereign behaviors inconsistent with
its key precepts.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
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It was in fact the United Nations Security Council, operating
under the authority of Chapter VII, that gave its backing to an
international constitutional innovation, the Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, even if that innovation is only an ad hoe
one.' On the other hand, it is well known that the United Nations
is going through a crisis of redefinition in the post-cold war era, and
its credibility in the security and peace-protecting arena has been
severely tarnished.' United Nations officials have been quick to
project blame onto the sovereignty aspect of international power.66
They hold that stripped of all the trimmings, the United Nations
serves as a directorate of states.67 If this is the reality, then two of
the most important premises built into the Charter may be severely
compromised. I refer to use of the "people" and the "individual" as
important constraints and components of international legal order.
The weaknesses of the United Nations generally in the context of
peace and security are nowhere more vividly underlined than in the
recent withdrawal from Somalia,' the failures in Rwanda, and the
continuing ineffectiveness of its peacemaking efforts in the former
Yugoslavia.69 In defense of the United Natio one may quote
Ambassador Herbert Okun, who recently said "diplomacy without at
least the threat of force is like baseball without a bat."70 Apart from
the limitations in the United Nations' mandate, there have been
widespread concerns voiced verbally or in the media about the United
Nations' role in the former Yugoslavia. A random selection of the
events which prompted these concerns includes:
(1) United Nations commanders declining to investigate charges that
peace monitors were having sexual relations with Muslim women
captured by the Serbs;
64. See Robert Marquand, U.S. Must Support War Crimes Prosecution, CHRISTIAN Sc.
MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1994, at 19.
65. See Christopher S. Wren, Mismanagement and Waste Erode U.N.'s Best Intentions, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at Al; Crossette, supra note 46.
66. Wren, supra note 65, at Al.
67. Id.
68. See Donatella Lorch, Last of the U.S. Troops Leave Somalia, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26,1994,
at Al; Elaine Sciolino, The Somalia Mission: The U.N.'s Glow is Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,1993,
at Al.
69. See Anthony Lewis, Lessons of Disasterin Bosnia, GANESVILLE SuN, July 18,1995; see
also Roger Cohen, Honor, Too, is Put to Flight in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 4, at 1;
Chuck Sudetic, Asserting Croatia Invaded, Bosnia Appeals to U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994,
§ 1, at 3 (discussing generally United Nations involvement in Bosnia).
70. GUTMAN, supra note 2.
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(2) the murder of the Bosnian vice-president;
(3) the vulnerability of the safe havens in Bosnia;
(4) the disquiet about the level of fraternization between General
Miadic and U.N. Commander Rose, because the former has been
named as a potential war criminal;
(5) the disquiet about the even-handed approach which requires
collaboration with aggressors;
(6) the evenhanded policy leading cynics to suggest that Mr. Akashi
has a "pro Serb" bias because of the difference in relative power
positions of the aggressor and victims of aggression; and
(7) that the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the former
Yugoslavia has suffered from public misunderstanding of its limited
mandate and that its peacekeepers have even been called the
"capos" of the concentration camps.71
Perhaps the effort to project a neutral good offices role in a context
of aggression and the grotesque violation of human rights precepts
denigrates the United Nations because it is an impossible goal.
The crisis the United Nations faces is not simply focused on the
legal and policy dimensions of its constitutional architecture in the
post-cold war era. Rather, the situation the United Nations finds itself
in raises the important issue of international public opinion regarding
the organization. That opinion is an authority base crucial to
maintaining the effective role and function of the organization.72
The disasters of the United Nations in Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia have tended to overshadow many other
important areas in which the United Nations remains an essential
institution of world order. Probably the policy most damaging to the
United Nations has been the imposition of an arms embargo on the
poorly armed Bosnians-an act of dubious international validity and
a genuine restriction of Bosnian sovereignty. 3 The United Nations'
corresponding inability to prevent a continuation of the policies of
ethnic cleansing and genocide only compounds the problem.
The failure to allow the victims of aggression to invoke an
inherent Charter right of self-defense, and the incapacity to provide
effective protection from atrocity and murder, are especially damaging
to an institution whose power resonates from its credibility and its
sense of high rectitude. Because United Nations officials talk
71. See Robert D. Kaplan, Inside The Balkan Nightmare, WASH. POST, Book World, Mar.
5, 1995, at 5 (book review).
72. See Crossette, supra note 46.
73. Winston P. Nagan, Rethinking Bosnia and Herzegovina's Right of Self-Defense: A
Comment, 52 INT'L COMMISSION JuRiTS 35 (1994).
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somewhat despairingly of taking orders from a "directorate of
sovereigns," it seems that the role of the "people" and the "individu-
al" subjects of general international law are defined away from the
core juridical and political cognizance they achieved under earlier
Charter practice. On the other hand, the ad hoc Tribunals provide a
juridical framework that seeks to vindicate the rights of individual
victims and simultaneously provide human rights protection for
individual potential defendants.74 Perhaps this requires us to again
examine the core precept behind the Nuremberg process.7
VIn. NUREMBERG, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY
The war crimes trials in Nuremberg76 and Tokyo represent the
most remarkable exception to the decentralized character of interna-
tional criminal law. The great historic question about Nuremberg is
whether it was an aberration, or whether it represents a sufficiently
strong institutional expression of the international rule of law in action
so that the process of criminal justice it created will become central to
an improved world order. Indeed, I would suggest that a central
policy feature of Nuremberg was the ancient function of the law of
preventive politics. In this sense, the law serves as a restraint on
unlimited decisional competence because it requires some minimal
responsibility and accountability for decisions.
74. In practice, international tribunals for prosecuting war crimes are not without precedent
(for example, the tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II), but they are
exceptional. The dominant expectation is that war criminals should be tried in national fora,
often the fora of the victor. Cf. Roling, supra note 22, at 201:
International law relies heavily on national law. It uses different means for assuring that
international rules are sanctioned by national courts. One of the means is to grant
national legislators the liberty (or impose upon the duty) to apply universally their
national penal provisions: the principle of universality, that is the universal appeal of
national law.
Id. See also United States v. Calley, 48 CMR 19 (1973) (affirming Calley's conviction although
he argued that he merely obeyed superior orders). Cf. Kurt Schork, War Crimes Trial Opens
In Sarajevo, REUTER LiBR. REP., Mar. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File;
United Nations: Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing An International Tribunal
For The Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in The Territory of The Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
75. One of the most fundamental principles of Nuremberg was the notion of individual
responsibility. HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLMCS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW:
SELECrED ESSAYS 138-57 (1961).
76. See generally S. Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 853 (1990).
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The Nuremberg Tribunal held the agents of state decision making
personally responsible for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. These transgressions were not only international
legalwrongs, but wrongs punishable through the ascription of personal
responsibility by criminal law sanctions. The message of Nuremberg
is clear. Those who authorized and committed crimes against the
peace, war crimes and humanitarian crimes would be personally
responsible for those crimes and would be made to suffer the
consequences of their conduct. To hold the perpetrators of these
proscribed forms of conduct accountable signifies that terrible things
cannot be done to people without a resulting meaningful international
sense of responsibility.
Nuremberg's detractors have attacked it on two grounds: it was
seen to represent the victors' justice, and it was thought to compro-
mise the nulla poena principle. I have not viewed these as the
strongest objections to the Nuremberg process.77 I believe that the
real objections to Nuremberg are tied to sovereignty issues. First,
Nuremberg made the sovereign state and its officials subject to the
international rule of law. This was precisely the point that U.S.
Secretary of War Henry Stimson had in mind when he lent his weight
to the idea of trying the Nazi war criminals.78 At the core of his
thinking was the idea of a crime against the peace as part of the
indictment.79 Second, Nuremberg permitted penetration of the veil
of sovereignty in order to identify the concrete agents of decision who
were responsible for criminal behavior. From an international law
perspective, the idea that individuals could be directly responsible
under international law subverted a cardinal tenet of the positivist
conception of international law-that it is a law of sovereign states for
sovereign states.
If individuals are directly subject to international legal obligations,
77. The critics of Nuremberg in the United States included Robert Taft and Norman
Thomas. See WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATITUDES
TOWARDS THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIME TRIALS 39 (1970). The problem with the
argument of victors' justice is that it ignores the decentralized character of the international
constitutive process, and argues essentially that because there is no central, neutral authority, war
crimes must be consigned to a legal vacuum. Victors' justice is an aspect of the principle of
jurisdiction by necessity. See IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE: WAR CRIMES HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1991).
78. A detailed account of his role (and that of others) is found in BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE
ROAD To NUREMBERG (1981).
79. Id. at 92-94, 108.
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they are also directly entitled to international legal rights. This
principle was implied in Nuremberg in two ways., First, the victim had
rights that international law could honor collectively through the
criminal law. Second, the defendants had rights to fair judicial
proceedings."s Nuremberg was also a revolutionary event in another
sense. It was meant to tie deterrence directly to criminal responsibility
of elites, who make war acting under color of sovereign authority.
This is not meant to underplay the importance of the humanitarian
aspect of the Nuremberg process. War, however, is often a core
condition of immense humanitarian and human rights abuse.
It may also be worth mentioning what potential alternatives to the
Nuremburg trials were considered. The British Lord Chancellor, Lord
Simon, believed that the summary execution of certain Nazi leaders
would solve the problem of justice and retribution."' Stalin, on the
other hand, thought that the summary execution of 50,000 S.S. officers
and soldiers would satisfy the demand for retribution.' Given this
kind of political reality, it is surprising that Nuremberg's process has
been so juridically suspect based on the charge of victors' justice and
the alleged violation of the nulla poena principle.
As indicated, the Nuremberg process established the principle
that the veil of sovereignty could be judicially pierced, and that
individuals responsible for substantive criminal acts of a grave nature
could be personally responsible. In a single stroke, Nuremberg
established a precept of limitation on the sovereignty doctrine, while
80. Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the Prosecution in the Nuremberg Trials, declared
in his opening statement of November 21, 1945:
Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations which may affect
the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world should be candidly faced. There is a
dramatic disparity between the circumstances of the accusers and the accused that might
discredit our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and
temperate .... We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defen-
dants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detach-
ment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself to posterity
as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 33-34 (1971).
81. SMITH, supra note 78, at 46-47. Smith notes that Lord Simon prepared a draft of a
paper advocating summary execution of high-ranking Nazis:
On 4 September [Lord] Simon completed the draft, which advanced a number of legal
and political arguments to show the trials were inappropriate. It contended that the
Moscow Declaration, stating that "the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies,"
would determine the fate of the Nazi leaders, implied that the problem would be dealt
with politically, not judicially. Simon concluded, therefore, that the best thing to do was
simply to shoot a handful of the top Nazi leaders like Hitler and Himmler.
82. Id. at 63.
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also establishing precepts of transparency, accountability, legal
personality and international efficacy for the idea of criminal
responsibility. More than that, the precept of universal personal
jurisdiction, as well as preemptory principles of international law such
as substantive legal precepts unconstrained by state sovereignty, are
suggestive of how important a legal innovation the Nuremberg process
was and is. The addition of crimes against the peace is, in effect, the
explicit outlawing of aggression conjoined with the principle of
personal responsibility. This addition is a further indication of how far
the Nuremberg idea cut into the statist, sovereignty-dominated
paradigm of international law.
If we view the operational state of international criminal law as
constitutionally allocated to sovereign states by custom, practice and
treaty law, then Nuremberg was an important constitutional allocation
of competence to the international community and away from the
sovereign nation state. This, in my view, is the accurate juridical
position which Nuremberg (and Tokyo) occupied in the global
constitutive process. The Nuremburg tribunal confronted the dualism
between sovereign versus personal responsibility directly: "He who
violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing
action moves outside its competence under International Law."
83
Shortly after the Nuremberg decision, the United Nations General
Assembly, in a unanimous resolution, affirmed the Nuremberg
principles as accepted principles of international criminal law.s'
Perhaps the most concise statement of the essential juridical meaning
of the Nuremberg process came from Justice Jackson:
An agreement between the major powers for the first time made
explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as the Tribunal has
declared, implicit in International Law namely, that to prepare,
incite, or wage a war of aggression ... is a crime against interna-
tional society, and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to
individuals or minorities on political, racial or religious grounds in
connection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport
civilian populations, is an international crime....
83. The Nuremberg Decision, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
84. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1947).
85. Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President of the United States on the
Nuremberg Trials (Oct. 7 1946), cited in ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE at XIV-
XV (1947).
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IX. THE AD HOC TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
The excursion into the core community policies behind the
Nuremberg judgment is an important backdrop to evaluate some
important themes and issues that accompany the creation of the ad
hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 6 In this part of the article,
I focus on some of the dominant themes that have attended the
creation, organization and functions of the ad hoc Tribunal. Permit
me to start with an expression of skepticism. For this kind of tribunal
to be a success, it must (1) successfully prosecute a sufficiently large
number of international criminal defendants; (2) prosecute high level
governmental officials - those who planned and ordered the
implementation of policies deemed criminal at the international level;
and (3) produce a historical record comparable to Nuremberg and
record the atrocities uncovered by the United Nations, states and
credible non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the former
Yugoslavia. These are, in my view, the minima for international
credibility.
My skepticism lies in the murky process by which this initiative
was launched. While reading various reports and United Nations
documents, one does not have a feel for the underlying hesitation that
vast numbers of governmental officials, as well as international civil
servants, may feel for such a process. Given that this hesitation did
in fact exist, why did the process go forward?
If we can pick a date that actually starts the war in the former
Yugoslavia, it would be June 27, 1991, when the Jugoslavenska
Narodna Armija (JNA-the Yugoslav People's Army) attacked the
provisional Slovenian militia.Y The war in Croatia dates to about the
middle of July, when hostilities broke out in areas of Croatia with
large Serb populations. The war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
early April of 1992.8
86. See Stanley Meisler, Security Council Oks Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1993, at A8; Julia Preston, United Nations Security Council Establishes Yugoslav War
Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,1993, at Al; Theodor Meron, The Case For War Crimes
Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 122. On the legal basis for the Security
Council establishing the Tribunal, see Report of Special Task Force of the ABA Section of
International Law and Practice, Report On The International Tribunal To Adjudicate War
Crimes Committed in The Former Yugoslavia 9-11 (1993).
87. Marcus Tanner, Slovenia Now At War, THE INDEPENDENT, June 28, 1991, at 1.
88. HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
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The nature of the.war has generated grave breaches of the main
precepts of humanitarian: law. Concentration camps doubling as death
camps, torture camps, and rape camps have been exposed.89 As well,
evidence of genocide, mass killings, disappearances and the like has
come to light. By mid-1992, the Security Council was compelled to
draw attention to these violations of international humanitarian law
and basic human rights standards. Security Council Resolution 764
drew particular attention to obligations under international humanitar-
ian law, suggesting the possibility of individual responsibility for grave
violations.' Resolution 771 called on states to collect and present to
the Security Council data on the violations of humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia.91 Resolution 780 required the United Nations
Secretary-General to establish an impartial commission of experts to
collect and evaluate evidence of violations of international humanitari-
an law.92
Resolution 808 entailed an agreement in principle to establish an
international tribunal to prosecute persons for serious violations of
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia?3 The Report of the
Secretary-General, May 3, 1993, contains a statute for an international
criminal tribunal as well as the justification for its establishment.94
Resolution 827 established the "international tribunal for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former
Yugoslavia .... ""
The events leading to the creation of the ad hoc Tribunal may
suggest a logical, rational progression from the initiation of war to
atrocity, to an ineluctable form of international intervention in the
form of the Tribunal. This conclusion is misleading and may hamper
rather than facilitate the process of the Tribunal in the long run.96
The true story emerges from an appreciation of what concerned
decision-makers knew, when they knew it, and what they did or did
89. See also DOCUMENTA CROATIA: ON CROATIAN HISTORY AND IDENTITY AND THE
WAR AGAINST CROATIA (Zvonimir Separovic ed., 1991); MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN
CROATIA 1991-92: A BOOK OF EVIDENCE (1992).
90. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESn764 (1992).
91. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES771 (1992).
92. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/780 (1992).
93. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1992).
94. Secretary General's Report, supra note 74.
95. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5.
96. J. T. Nguyen, Legal Experts Named to Balkans War-Crimes Panel, UPI, Oct. 26, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See also Marquand, supra note 64.
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not do about it. This narrative still has to bewritten and warrants an
entire article on its own. Because the narrative -in effect would be an
essay on the conditions that gave birth to the Tribunal, it may be
useful to highlight key features of them.
Although there had been scattered and occasional reporting on
the war and its human consequences, Resolution 764 triggered
international concern at the highest levels of international decision-
making. It was almost a month later that Resolution 771 called on
members to supply the Security Council with data. A great deal was
known long before these resolutions were adopted. Certainly states
that make human rights reporting a normal part of the apparatus of
diplomacy, like the United States, might have expected to be leading
rather than following in this matter. Two key U.S. non-governmental
sources were particularly prominent in generating a mountain of
disquieting facts about the situation on the ground, especially in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. One such source was the reports of Roy
Gutman of Newsday,97 but even more influential was the key report
of the Helsinki Watch Committee which came out in August of
1992.98 These two sources had a substantial influence on public
opinion. Indeed, the Watch Committee report carried the credibility
of systematic reporting and strong scholarly craft skills.99
The Watch Committee report was given added impact and
credibility by an August 15 report by the U.S. Senate's Foreign
Relations Committee titled "The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-
Herzegovina."'"' On September 23, the U.S. Government, pursuant
to Resolution 771, submitted a modest eleven page initial report to the
Security Council.' 0' On October 22, a second, more substantial
sixteen page report citing such sources as the New York Times, the
Washington Post, USA Today and an extended quotation from a
report of Gutman to Newsday was given to the Council.'° I believe
a case can be made that the Bush administration's approach to the
problem was belated.
97. GUTMAN, supra note 2.
98. HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1.
99. Id.
100. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (1992).
101. Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 22, 1992,
USUN Press Release 96-(92).
102. Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Oct. 22, 1992,
USUN Press Release 108-(92).
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The problem was certainly a difficult one in an election year. The
policy process became even more murky when Lawrence Eagleburger
became acting Secretary of State. Eagleburger had served as U.S.
ambassador to Yugoslavia, and it has been alleged he was a former
"drinking buddy of Milosevic."' Moreover, "as a private citizen he
was a co-director with Milosevic of the Yugoslav Bank, and was also
president of the company importing Yugo cars to the United States.
He was the director of Kissinger and Associates, the principal lobbying
group for Yugoslavia, and was paid more than $1.5 million."'1' It is
interesting to note that three distinguished foreign service officers in
charge of the Yugoslav desk, namely George Kennedy from the Bush
administration and Marshall Harris and Ian Weston from the Clinton
administration,"5 resigned from the Department of State to protest
the inaction endorsed by the U.S. policy on Yugoslavia.
The Watch Committee's report named names. The names of
potential defendants rapidly became familiar in households in the
West. They included Blogoje Adzic (JNA), Dragoslav Bokan
(paramilitary), Mirko Jovic (paramilitary), Radovan Karadzic
(President, SDP of B/A), Slobodan Milosevic (President, Serbia),
Ratko Mladic (JNA), Zivota Panic (JNA), Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan-
Paramilitary), and Vojslav Seslj (paramilitary). The report states that
Helsinki Watch "believes that sufficient evidence is available to
warrant the investigation of the [above] persons to determine whether
they have committed the war crimes described in this report."'1 6
The impact of early reporting and the impact of a powerful report
from the Helsinki Watch Committee was responsible for, among other
initiatives, what appeared on the surface to be a strong diplomatic
initiative by the Bush administration. In August 1992, the administra-
tion called for a special session of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission and demanded the appointment of a Special Rappor-
teur.1°t Whether this demand represented an attempt to pass the
103. Arun K. Mitra, U.S. Policies Have Helped Serbs Dominate, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 7B.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
107. On August 13, 1992, the United States requested an unprecedented session of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission. See John R. Bolton, Unspeakable Savagery in
Former Yugoslavia, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1992, Vol. 3, No. 33 at 647. The
United States maintained that it was "appalled at the unspeakable, immoral savagery being
unleashed on the civilians of what used to be Yugoslavia." Id. The United States called for a
number of charges to be issued and for an accounting from those responsible. It demanded the
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buck or a serious effort to make the Commission a player, is unclear.
The Bush administration then invoked its other "ace in the hole,"
the Resolution 771 data collection procedure. Once this procedure
was used, the Security Council had the responsibility to do something.
After the Bush administration's electoral loss, Secretary Eagleburger
presented a further report to the Council naming potential defendants,
a matter widely discussed in congressional and public opinion-forming
circles in the United States, because of earlier NGO and news reports.
As suggested, the Watch Committee's report came at an awkward
time for United States electoral politics. Administration inaction on
credible evidence of genocide and worse would have fueled the
campaign of the opposition. It may be that the electoral position of
the parties had a good deal to do with the administration putting the
Bosnian crisis away from domestic politics and squarely on the agenda
of first the Human Rights Commission and later the Security Council.
As for the other permanent members of the Council and their
position on this matter, the reluctance of the United Kingdom, Russia
and China to take action could be eminently predicted. For the latter
two powers in particular, opposition to international intrusion into the
internal affairs of a state, especially regarding human rights standards,
has a long-standing history.
It is therefore a tribute to the power of the modern media and
persistent NGO work that the Council was shamed into taking action.
The creation of a commission to investigate the tragedy was naturally
the next battleground. The initial work of the Commission of Experts
for Yugoslavia, starved as it was for resources, provoked derogatory
newspaper headlines." s Furthermore, Professor Fritz Kalshoven, the
first head of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, indicated that
appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate the matter. President Bush stated in a radio
address from this time:
[T]he war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is a complex, convoluted conflict that
grows out [of] age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being spilled over century-
old feuds. The lines between enemies and even friends are jumbled and fragmented...
Blood feuds are very different to resolve.
President Bush, Containing the Crisis in Bosnia and the Former Yugoslavia (Aug. 6, 1992), in
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DIsPATCH, Aug. 10, 1992, Vol. 3, No. 32 at 617. In another speech, Bush
noted:
[E]ven in our new world, as old threats recede, new ones emerge. With the end of the
East-West standoff, ideology has given way to ethnicity as a key factor for conflict.
Ancient hatreds, ethnic rivalries frozen in time, threaten to revive themselves and
reignite. We see it now in the war-ravaged Balkans ....
Facing New Challenges of Diplomacy Remark, Naval Academy Comment and Annapolis, MD
(May 27, 1992), in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, June 1, 1992, Vol. 3, No. 22 at 424.
108. See, eg., Roy Gutman, War Crimes Unit Hasn't a Clue, NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 1993, at 8.
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the scope of the agenda was so overwhelming that questions were
raised about whether the Commission could at the end of the day
serve any useful purpose. In an article published in March 1993,
Professor Kalshoven indicated that "[t]here is no way a tribunal could
work in the present atmosphere of anti-Serb propaganda, which is
rampant all over the world.., a tribunal can take place only at the
end of the conflict," and agreed that the end of the conflict might be
ten years or more.'" Professor Kalshoven also stated that the
formation of a Tribunal would be "quite some while off," adding that
he was "not overly optimistic" one would ever come about." ° It is
a tribute to Professor Cherif Bassiouni, the second chairman of the
Commission, that a sufficiently credible body of evidence was created
to effectually compel the creation of an ad hoc tribunal.
On February 22, 1993, the Security Council voted on the French
proposal that the Secretary-General prepare a report detailing the
specific structure and procedures of the ad hoc Tribunal."' There
was and is little public opposition to the Tribunal; the concern appears
to be its potential effectiveness. If the Tribunal and its Rwandan
counterpart do credible work in detecting, apprehending, prosecuting,
convicting and punishing the war crimes defendants, the specific and
more general stakes for world order under law will be strengthened.
Specifically, it will give political weight to the present impetus to put
life into the idea of a permanent court. This in itself would be a
radical and highly progressive addendum to an improved world order.
The successful international prosecution of high level state officials
and their underlings has broad implications for the world constitutive
process. It reinvents and applies as an international legal expectation
the concepts of responsibility, transparency and accountability as issues
central to the idea of limiting government, and correspondingly limits
the excesses that are justified under the label of "sovereignty."
However, the Tribunal got off to a rocky start when political
considerations and pressures led to the appointment of a prosecutor,
Ramon Escovar Salon, whose ability to organize the massive task of
implementing the Security Council Resolution from scratch inspired
little international confidence."' Salon later resigned the position
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The Security Council approved the French proposal in Resolution 808. S.C. Res. 808,
supra note 94.
112. Marquand, supra note 64.
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and Justice Goldstone, who had headed the "Goldstone Commission"
investigating the causes of violence and political intimidation in South
Africa, became the new War Crimes Prosecutor.1 13  Goldstone's
reputation for professionalism, integrity and the ability to get things
done was a major boon to the process envisioned for the ad hoc
Tribunal.
The Tribunal's apparent practical problems remain immense. Not
only is the budget of the Tribunal inadequate, the infra-structural cost
of the operation, including salaries of judges and high level administra-
tors, will doubtless leave'few resources for the practical work of
investigations. 4 Rhetorical commitment in this context does not
mean much if it is not matched by numbers.
The resources issue regarding the ongoing work of the Tribunal
is absolutely critical if the process is not to be severely undermined.
There is also no question that the United States will have to lead the
way on the resources issue. Within the United States, it is Congress
that holds the effective control over the budget, and it is the Republi-
can party, which now controls Congress, which has taken some of the
toughest, most visible stands against international lawlessness and
criminality in Yugoslavia. It is the Republicans who will have a great
deal to do with the extent of the United States' commitment to the
work of the Tribunal.
Although there exists some skepticism about the political will that
attended the creation and functioning of the ad hoc Tribunal, the most
difficult task it will confront is apprehending defendants and bringing
them to trial. The veil of sovereignty may well serve as a shield for
many defendants whose prima facie situation indicates probable cause
for a war crimes indictment. Here, it seems to me that rules relating
to the handling of absent defendants may have interesting and
important potential for advancing the work of the Tribunal.
X. HANDLING THE ABSENT DEFENDANT
Under Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute of the Tribunal, a defendant
has the right to be "tried in his presence . ... "5 This limitation
113. Id.
114. The proposed budget for 1994 was some $32.5 million. The cost to the U.S. for
prosecuting John Gotti, the mafia king-pin, was $75 million. The Iran-Contra investigation, a
much smaller scale investigation, cost the American taxpayers some $40 million. Robert
Marquard quotes a Washington law firm as follows: "[T]he budget they put together last year
was $20 million short of what they need for a minimally credible prosecution." Id.
115. Tribunal Statute, supra note 15, art. 21(4)(d).
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reflects prescriptive protections accorded prospective defendants in,
inter alia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The practical problem which this provision presents is that the
Tribunal may not be able to practically acquire physical control over
the person of a defendant, and thus may not be able to proceed with
the prosecution of the case against that defendant. The legal advice
that a potential defendant inside the former Yugoslavia might receive
is essentially not to submit to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by
showing up in the Hague. Rule 61(A), as well as paragraphs (B), (C),
(D) and (E), provide a procedure whereby a judge of the Tribunal
"shall" order the indictment to be submitted to the Trial Chamber,
together with all the evidence that was presented to the judge who
confirmed the indictment."6 The prosecutor may supply additional
evidence such that there are "reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the
indictment ... ."1' The question is whether this procedure is
enough to guarantee a more effective response to the case of the
reluctant war crimes defendant. I am uncertain. However, I think the
formulation must be strengthened if it is to have a chance of giving
the Tribunal the credibility it needs. I would first suggest that the
"additional evidence" provision be strengthened beyond the reason-
ableness test to something like a "clear and convincing" standard. I
think that this will strengthen the international arrest warrant (super
arrest warrant) in terms of legitimacy and credibility."8 It will also
permit the court to construct the public record with a limited juridical
imprimatur. The principle is already codified in Rule 61; the issue is
whether it can be strengthened.
The practical reason for invoking the Rule 61 procedure for a
super arrest warrant is not only the laudable objective of creating
international outlaw status for a war crimes defendant. It may also
serve the purpose of providing a juridical determination, albeit for a
limited purpose, that there are reasonable grounds (I prefer clear and
convincing grounds) for believing that an identifiable individual
defendant is responsible under this standard of probative evidence for
specific crimes against specific people in specific places at specific
times. The construction of such a public record would also serve the
116. Id. at Rule 61(A).
117. Id. at Rule 61(C).
118. Id. at Rule 61(D) (stating "[t]he Trial Chamber shall also issue an international arrest
warrant in respect of the accused which shall be transmitted to all States.").
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function of an international "truth and justice" commission. The
creation of a public record is not as desirable as a conviction over a
present defendant, but serves the important purpose of shaming and
delegitimizing war criminal "thugs" who control the organs of state
sovereignty in order to shield themselves from international criminal
responsibility. Moreover, this procedure may hold important value for
the record of the abuse of women in the war context.
XI. WAR CRIMES THAT SPECIFICALLY
VICTIMIZE WOMEN
The Bosnian war raised, in a very explicit way, the general
problems of the situation of women in war, the problem of women
and humanitarian values in situations of armed conflict, and the more
general question of women and gross human rights violations in
contexts of war and peace. The victimization of women in war
contexts has often come in the form of sexual aggression- rape or
sexual battery and various other sex-related forms of abuse. The focus
on the distinctive ways in which women are made primary victims of
rape and sexual abuse is not meant to understate the other ways in
which women are made victims of mass murder, genocide, disappear-
ances, extrajudicial executions, torture and other forms of cruel,
unusual and degrading treatment. The fact is that women experience
rape, sexual battery and allied abuses, invariably in a way that men do
not.
Without an elaborate canvass of the history of rape and sexual
battery in the conduct of war, it may be recognized that in war, a
sharp distinction is made between the "we" and the "other"-the
enemy. Since the "other" includes women who are often neither
armed nor trained in the use of arms, they are among the most
vulnerable sectors of the "enemy" that may constitute an object of
destruction-an object of war.
The specter of armed men confronting unarmed women has been
an understated aspect of war from antiquity to Bosnia. In World War
I, the German aggression included a tactical and strategic objective of
atrocity against conquered civilian populations to ensure rapid
submission to German occupation. Rape of Belgian and French
women was an essential part of the strategy of aggression and
conquest. In this sense the Belgian and French women were made an
object of war.
During the 1930s, the Sino-Japanese war produced the notorious
"Rape of Nanking," as the Japanese conquering armies attempted to
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prove the superiority of the Japanese race over the inferior Chinese
people by making the Chinese women of Nanking an object of
Japanese conquest and aggression. Consider how an American
missionary described Nanking under the Japanese occupation: "[n]ever
have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! We
estimate at least 1,000 cases a night, and many by day. In the case of
resistance.., there is a bayonet stab or a bullet. We could write up
hundreds of cases a day.""' 9 It was estimated after the war by the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East that approximately
20,000 cases of rape occurred in Nanking in the first month of the
Japanese occupation." The Tribunal also stated: "[t]he barbarous
behavior of the Japanese army cannot be excused as the acts of a
soldiery which had temporarily gotten out of hand .... ",121 This
statement implies the obvious: women were an object of Japanese war
aims, an object of aggressive war.
Europe, especially Eastern Europe in World War II, provides
evidence of massive rape practices by the German army and the
special security forces. Since rape practices followed a particular
pattern, and especially targeted women, women became an object of
aggressive, racial war."
In the post-war period in Bangladesh, the Pakistan army sought
to suppress a drive for independence by a policy of mass rape and
torture.'2 Statistics indicate that some 200,000 to 400,000 rapes
occurred during a nine month period. 4 It may be noted that during
the Vietnam war the incidence of rape by the enemy, or the Vietcong,
was marginal."5 One explanation for this outcome was that Viet-
cong men and women fought side-by-side and thus established lines of
mutual respect that extended to enemy women. 26
Although crimes against the peace are omitted from the compe-
tence of the Tribunal, the question that insistently confronts interna-
tional lawyers concerned about the legal regulation of armed conflict
is this: as wars of aggression are unlawful and constitute crimes against
the peace, may it not be a plausible construction of the concept of
119. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 58 (1975).
120. Id. at 60-61.
121. Id. at 61.
122. Id. at 48-56.
123. Id. at 80.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 90.
126. Id. at 91.
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aggression that when aggression makes rape and allied depredations
against women an object of aggressive war, such abuses are part of the
definition of aggressive war and hence constitute a universally
proscribed crime against the peace? If we are alert to the social
reality of aggressive war, as, for example, in Bosnia, these crimes
against women are distinctive crimes against the peace and should
make those responsible subject to universal criminal jurisdiction. It is
therefore regrettable that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited so as to
exclude these crimes.
Although the scale of atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia has shocked the conscience of humankind, two particular
kinds of atrocities have permeated public opinion circles and the mass
media in general. These are (1) the systematic rape of women and
girls as a stratagem of the war making process; and (2) the use of
killing, torture, rape, mutilation, bombing of civilians, and other such
terror tactics as a stratagem to displace people from their homes in
order to "ethnically cleanse" cities, towns and villages. Recently, Time
magazine opined that "Bosnia opens a terrible new perspective. It
shows rape as policy to scorch the enemy's emotional earth."'27
The policy of systematic rape of Muslim and Croatian women and
girls in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a policy that seeks to ravage the core
sense of personal identity and dignity of women. Rape is an aspect of
humanitarian law codified in the Geneva Conventions since rape is a
form of "mutlation"--both physical and psychological; it is "cruel
treatment," and it is a form of "torture" experienced exclusively by
women."2 It is also an outrage "upon personal dignity" and is a
particular form of "humiliating and degrading treatment."'29 Rape
127. Lance Morrow, Unspeakable: Is rape an inevitable-and marginal-part of war? IME,
Feb. 22,1993, at 48. The cover of Newsweek's August 17, 1992 issue shows a displaced Bosnian
child and is titled "Ethnic Cleansing: Bosnia's Cry For Help." NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1992.
128. This principle is stated in common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. See
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12,1949, art 3,6 U.S.T. 3114,3116-18,75 U.N.T.S. 31,32-24 [hereinafter 1949
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,1949, art. 3,6 U.S.T. 3217,3220-22,
75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
136-38 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 267,
288-290 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV].
129. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 128, art. 3(I)(c), 6 U.S.T. at 3118, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 34; 1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 128, art. 3(I)(c), 6 U.S.T. at 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at
88; 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 128, art. 3(I)(c), 6 U.S.T. at 3320,75 U.N.T.S. at 138;
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is a crime against humanity when it is a part of the official war policy
of a party and when it is done in a systematic and continuous manner.
Because this kind of war policy is also designed to further the policies
behind ethnic cleansing, and because rape and ethnic cleansing are
aspects of genocide in the context of this crisis, it is important to
outline the general problem of genocide in the context of this war.
The systematic and continuous implementation of the policies of
mass rape against women are part of the framework of acts committed
with the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical...
or religious group... [by] causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group . ... 2 0 In addition, the systematic aspect of
the mass rape policy may be seen as "deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part . . ." in the sense that the rape policy is
designed to destroy the psychological bonds of marriage and other
family ties that secure the cultural basis for community cohesion and
existence. 3' The rape policy is meant to destroy interpersonal
respect, family ties and relations, the cultural status of women, and the
family mores of group or national life.
The evidence seems to be substantial that women have been one
of the primary targets of "ethnic cleansing". Rape and other forms of
sexual aggression have been a key tactic to implement the policy of
ethnic cleansing. Since ethnic cleansing is also a war aim of the
aggressor, rape and sexual aggression against women, girls and even
men have been a tactical instrument to realize this strategic objective.
The phrase "ethnic cleansing" translates into a euphemism for the
crime of genocide. These words carry some implicit nationalist
justification for brutal and inhuman acts against mankind which are
being done in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What the Tribunal is confronted
with here is the crime of genocide.
The definition of genocide is thus broad enough to encompass
many of the behaviors that have constituted crimes against humanity,
war crimes and crimes against the peace. These crimes have the
purpose of destroying in whole or in part the existence of nations
within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have employed the tools
of "killing" as well as doing "serious bodily or mental harm" to the
1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 128, art. 3(I)(c), 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
130. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II,
T.I.A.S. No. 1021,78 U.N.T.S. 277,280.
131. Id
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victims of genocide and allied crimes.132
The statute of the Tribunal omits crimes against the peace from
the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal. However,
the juridical basis of the entire statute is founded upon the Security
Council's power to be seized of and enforce matters of international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
I would respectfully suggest, notwithstanding the omission of crimes
against the peace from the competence of the Tribunal, that it may be
entirely appropriate to use the Rule 61 procedure to broaden the basis
of juridical "fact finding" in order to put explicitly on the record the
proposition that defendants subject to the super arrest warrant
procedure were part of the mass rape policy which made women an
object of war, since the ethnic cleansing issue remains to this day an
object of the war-making process of the aggressor. Ethnic cleansing
may be fairly interpreted, as earlier indicated, to meet the criteria that
constitutes the crime of genocide, over which the tribunal does have
jurisdiction.'33 I suspect that the position of women in war is an
under-appreciated issue, probably from the beginning of recorded
history to Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A properly developed prosecuto-
rial record under Rule 61 may do much to give this issue appropriate
juridical recognition.
XII. CONCLUSION
It may be said that legal theory, or more specifically, a jurispru-
dence whose core foundations are rooted in the sovereignty precept,
may in reality be the undertaker of international law. International
criminal law may not be a player in the last rites of international law,
but it severely tests the validity and efficacy of an international law
that has to trump or limit sovereignty. The creation and functioning
of the ad hoc Tribunal to bring an internationally sanctioned criminal
justice standard to those who may have committed serious internation-
al law crimes in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in Rwanda, is a
welcome surprise, an astonishing challenge, and, indeed, a reason for
a serious commitment to the viability of the international rule of law
in our time. The alternative prospect may be a dismal new age.
132. Id.
133. Tribunal Statute, supra note 15, art. 4.
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